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THE ENIGMA OF MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
In Stouffer v. Morrison' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
the "governmental immunity" doctrine. This concept renders the Common-
wealth, both on the state and local level, immune from liability for the tortious
acts of its servants.2 The application of this principle often denies an ade-
quate legal remedy to those injured by governmental activities.3 Because the
state cannot be held liable, the injured party must seek compensation, in
many instances, from agents and employees of the government who have not
the means to fully compensate for their wrongful acts.
The immunity of the sovereign from tort liability has been based onl two
principal legal theories. The more popular theory is based on a historical
doctrine that "the king could do no wrong."'4 A serious misconception un-
dermines the foundation of this theory.5 During the Middle Ages in England
there was a definite concept of private rights. It was believed that a viola-
tion of these rights by a public authority constituted a wrong for which
redress had to be accorded. The king and his officials were not exempt
from this policy. 6 One historian noted that:
the infallible and irresponsible king was a conception of later days
and was historically unjustified. It is true that a writ did not lie
against the king but methods, partly indirect, were found to restore
the subject to the rights of which the acts of the king or his officials
had deprived him.
7
During this time, as expressed by Bracton, the maxim, the king could do no
wrong, meant he was not privileged to do wrong and not that he was in-
capable of doing wrong.s The modern interpretation of this concept de-
veloped in the sixteenth century and evolved from ideas associated with the
strengthening of the kingship and philosophical teachings about the immacu-
late king who was nothing less than a figure divine.9 Though pointing to
1. Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 162 A.2d 378 (1960).
2. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 101, 116 (Pa. 1843).
3. Boorse v. Springfield Twp. 337 Pa. 109, 103 A.2d 708 (1954); Elliott v. City
of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874); Fox v. The Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103
(Pa. 1841).
4. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility In Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 17 (1927).
5. Ibid.
6. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD I 3-4 (Cambridge 1905) ; Borchard, op. cit. supra note 4 at 18.
7. Borchard, supra note 4 at 18.
8. Id. at 22.
9. Id. at 31.
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this development as a ground for extreme criticism of the application of
the doctrine is, in itself, a weak argument, it is indeed peculiar that this
concept based on autocratic principles should be so firmly embraced by
courts of a country built upon democratic ideals.10
The second, and perhaps the more significant theory justifying the
"governmental immunity" doctrine, is explained by Justice Holmes in Kawa-
nanakoa v. Polyblank :11
A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal concep-
tion of absolute theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends.
Some authorities have interpreted this to mean that it is the state rather than
the king which is supreme and hence, can do no wrong. In opposition to
this position, the argument may be raised that it is the people and not the
state who are supreme in a democracy. Thus, it seems the theories underly-
ing the immunity principle are at least questionable.
1 2
The authority for the application of the "governmental immunity"
principle in Pennsylvania is Article I, Section 11 of the state constitution. It
is there provided that "Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth
in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the legislature may by
law direct." Legislative consent is thus a prerequisite to recovery. Needless
to say, the Pennsylvania General Assembly has not seen fit to authorize suit
except in a very few enumerated situations. A limited form of immunity has
also been extended to the local governments.
The rule of municipal governmental immunity in the Commonwealth
is based on a rather confusing concept whereby the type of function in which
the corporation was engaged at the time of the injury is controlling. If the
activity is "proprietary" in nature, the corporation may be liable for negligent
injuries wrought upon the plaintiff. If, however, the function is "govern-
mental" in nature, the municipal corporation is viewed as an agent or arm
of the state and is immune from liability.1 3 The difficulty lies in determining
which type of activity is involved. A test used by the courts to classify this
10. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (U.S. 1793).
11. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
12. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 25.01 (1959). It is generally agreed that the
stated grounds for exempting the sovereign from suit are not logical or practical.
13. Hill v. Allentown Housing Authority, 373 Pa. 92, 95 A.2d 519 (1953) ; Morris
v. Mt. Lebanon Twp. School District, 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d 737 (1958). The law of
municipal immunity may be traced to Russel v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng.
Rep. 359 (1788); Ashhurst, J, "It is better that an individual should sustain an injury
than that the public should be inconvenienced." Pennsylvania has not extended the
"Devon" rule to injuries resulting from negligence in the building and maintenance of
roads and bridges. Dean v. New Milford Township, 5 W. & S. 545 (Pa. 1843) (road)
Humphreys v. Armstrong County, 56 Pa. 204 (1867) (bridge).
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activity is cited in Morris v. Mt. Lebanon School District.14 If the function
is one which a local governmental unit is not required by statute to perform
or if it is used to raise revenue, the function is "proprietary." Police activi-
ties have been traditionally viewed as "governmental" functions because
they are prescribed by the general law. In addition, policemen act for the
benefit of the public at large and not for the city or township. 15 The import-
ance of this classification is vital when considering the Stouffer v. Morrison
decision.
The Stouffer case1 6 involved three police officers who, without provoca-
tion, assaulted and seriously injured an innocent citizen. A complaint was
filed against the Borough of Shippensburg alleging that the borough officials
were fully aware of the propensities of these policemen who had a recent
record of similar assaults. 17 The borough demurred and the motion was
sustained by the lower court. On appeal, the supreme court, adopting the
opinion of the trial court, held that a municipality's police officers, while
acting in a governmental capacity, are not the agents or servants of the
municipality but of the state, and the municipality is not liable for their
tortious acts irrespective of whether the municipality was aware of their
dangerous propensities.'
Although this is not the first case involving intentional torts,' 9 it is the
first Pennsylvania decision extending immunity to a municipal corporation
where the officers of the corporation actually knew of the pernicious tenden-
cies of their employees. Under the law of agency, it should be noted, this
knowledgeable acquiescence may have amounted to an authorization of such
conduct.2 0  The primary question then, which springs from the Stouffer
14. Morris v. Mt. Lebanon Twp. School District, 393 Pa. at 636, 144 A.2d at 739.
15. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility In Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 241 (1925).
16. Stouffer v. Morrison, supra note 1.
17. In the "Stouffer" complaint under the second count it was alleged that:
11. At various times in the recent past, the defendants . . .were guilty of
similar unprovoked and unjustifiable assault and battery upon persons
in Shippensburg, Pennsylvania.
12. The Borough of Shippensburg, defendant herein, was aware of the
aforesaid unprovoked and unjustifiable assaults and batterys upon persons
in Shippensburg, Pennsylvania, and such defendant did not dismiss . . .
(policemen in question) . . . from its police force, but instead ratified
and/or adopted the acts of such members of its police force.
Brief for Appellant, pp. 7a-8a Stouffer v. Morrison, supra note 1. Also see note 20 infra.
18. Stouffer v. Morrison, supra note 1.
19. Boorse v. Springfield Twp., 377 Pa. 109, 103 A.2d 708 (1954) (shooting a
race horse); Fox v. The Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841) (Conversion
of a horse).
20. RESTATEMENT 2d, AGENCY § 43(2) (1952) states: "Acquiescence by the prin-
cipal in a series of acts of the agent indicates authorization to perform similar acts in
the future." Comment b. of this section says that the inference arising from the
acquiescence may be rebutted. It would appear then that absent governmental immunity,
a trial would be necessary to effect the rebuttal and failure to do so would render the
borough liable.
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decision, is whether or not in light of the obvious injustice to the aggrieved
party and the potential threat to the public, the defense of governmental
immunity should remain available to the municipal corporation ?21 Since the
theories underlying the doctrine provide little justification, an examination
of contemporary policy considerations should be considered.
The following arguments are representative of those usually advanced
in favor of the concept. (1) Funds devoted to public purposes should not be
diverted to compensate private injuries.2 2 By its very nature the government
is organized to benefit society generally. Private compensation to individuals
is beyond the capacity of the government in a monetary sense, and is also a
violation of certain constitutional provisions prohibiting class legislation.
23
An answer to this argument is that if activities are of an injury produc-
ing nature, compensation of those injuries should be a normal cost of the
activity.2 4 Protection of public funds should not take precedence over the
loss to an injured party; nor in a democracy should the government be
considered above the law. The true spirit of the Constitution as found in
the "Declaration of Rights" is the protection of the individual. Due to in-
creased governmental activity, unforeseen at the inception of the doctrine, the
risk of potential harm to the individual has correspondingly increased. Thus,
new laws guaranteeing compensation are now desirable and necessary to
assure the constitutional rights to peace, happiness and safety.
25
(2) The government's funds would be greatly depleted and there is even
a possibility that bankruptcy might follow the state's consent to liability.2 6
As it is, taxes are too high. To render the state liable would necessitate a
boost in the tax burden under which the public is already staggering. To
force compensation from existing revenue sources would result in an un-
balanced budget, an increased debt and perhaps economic chaos.
Such an argument is based upon two unwarranted assumptions. First,
that infinite liability would follow from the absence of governmental im-
munity. It must be remembered that the prerequisite of recovery is a tortious
21. See Elliott v. The City of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1847). The case involved
a policeman who negligently destroyed the plaintiff's horse and carriage. By the way
of dictum the court said, "If the city were to authorize a trespass, the city would be
responsible for it." Id. at 352.
22. HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1611 (1956).
23. PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 11 & 18. No special bill may be passed compensating or
allocating funds to an individual. See note 40, infra.
24. HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 22 at 1612; PROSSER, TORTS 775 (2d ed. 1955).
25. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
26. City of Miami Beach v. Bethel, 65 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1953) ; HARPER AND JAMES,
supra note 22 at 1611; Also for other arguments that have been advanced in this
area, see Justice Hobson's opinion (concurring specially) in City of Miami Beach v.
Bethel, supra at 36. Note particularly his explanation of the fallacies in the argument




act which would not occur with any greater regularity than in the ordinary
employer-employee relationship. Second, the financial status of the govern-
ment is so impoverished as to be incapable of bearing the full burden of its
activities. Such a premise is clearly fallacious for if financial security rests
at all, it is in the government. If bankruptcy be unduly feared, liability
insurance would certainly close this gap. In addition, the state is a much
better risk distributor than is any private citizen.
(3) The government, unlike private enterprise derives no profit from
its activities and hence should not be held accountable for its tortious acts.
2 7
ThrQugh profit, business corporations may increase price, production or both
to remedy losses stemming from liability. The government cannot do this.
It is not a business, in the literal sense and cannot be expected to be held
liable the same as private business concerns.
The fact that no profit is recovered from governmental activity is at
best a very weak excuse for a complete denial of recovery. As the corpora-
tion increases prices so also is the government able to increase taxes. Another
approach to those arguing business principles might be to assert that the
government is "big business" and its profit is actually the benefit it renders
to the public. 28 By denying liability, the benefits of government are reduced.
As good business policy seeks the highest possible profit, so should the
biggest business in the land strive to increase its return. This could best be
accomplished by not only allowing the public to receive the advantages of
state activity but also to bolster this profit with a bonus in the form of
protection from its evils.
A policy argument against governmental immunity, directed especially
toward municipal corporations and police activities, is that to shield the
municipality gives rise to greater opportunity for policemen and their em-
ployers to perpetrate unlawful acts against the private citizen. Individual
liability is not an adequate safeguard for reasons of financial irresponsibility.
Abolition of governmental immunity would allow the individual full recovery
in a court of law and more important, permit the public eye to scrutinize
closely the activities of government as revealed in the subsequent legal con-
tests. The potential threat of public litigation would serve to prevent the
municipal corporations from indulging in activity naturally repulsive to society.
In light of the foregoing policy considerations a strict application of the
doctrine of "governmental immunity" seems unwarranted; an extension such
as in the Stouffer decision seems unjustified. In essence, the need for modifi-
27. HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 22 at 1612; Smith, Municipal Tort Liability,
48 Micr. L. REV. 51 (1949).
28. HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 22 at 1612.
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cation is apparent. Positive steps have been taken in other jurisdictions to
remedy the evils nurtured by strict adherence to the immunity policy.
The United States Government has passed the Federal Torts Claims
Act.2" New York has swept away immunity by statute holding the state to be
liable "in accordance with the rules of law applied to actions . . . against
individuals or corporations. '3 0 Florida repudiated the concept by court de-
cision in Hargrove v. Town of Cocao Beach.3' The Supreme Court of
Illinois recently, through the Moliter v. Union School District case, 12 over-
ruled immunity previously extended to school districts.
As to the situation in Pennsylvania, perhaps the most extreme action to
correct the immunity problem would be to eliminate the entire doctrine. This
would necessarily involve all the complexities of amendment to the constitu-
tion."' Also, to extinguish the concept entirely is probably too extreme for
it may be wise to limit the liability of the state under special circumstances.
For example, during times of emergency, the safety and protection of a great
number of people might demand extreme measures by the government against
a limited number of individuals. Such action might result in excessive damage,
but is of such a nature that the public could not reasonably be expected to
make full compensation for the loss.
3 4
Constitutional considerations explain the court's inability to directly
overrule the doctrine of governmental immunity. There is however, a line of
reason which could be used by the courts to eliminate one stigma of the
doctrine. Looking at the facts of the Stouffer Case 3 5 the court could deny
governmental immunity as a defense by utilizing a concept based on waiver.
Quite tersely, the court could reason that the beating of an innocent citizen
is not, in any rational sense, a governmental function. As to the municipal
corporation, authorization of tortious conduct directly or indirectly3 6 con-
stitutes a waiver of the municipality's right to governmental immunity and
liability vests as if the acts of the policemen were "proprietary" in nature.
Perhaps on a future appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will adopt
the "waiver" theory to mitigate the harsh results now produced by the
29. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-2680 (1948).
30. N.Y. Court of Claims Act, § 8 (1929). See Holmes v. Erie Co., 266 App. Div.
220, 42 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1943) which construed the statute to include the state's political
subdivisions.
31. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (1957).
32. Molitor v. Kaneland Comm. Unit School Dist., 18 Il. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959)..
33. See PA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1; see infra note 40.
34. For example, intentionally dynamiting several buildings in a city, including
an antique shop with a priceless inventory, to prevent the whole city from being
annihilated by fire. See David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to
Immunity from Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1 (1959).
35. Stouffer v. Morrison, supra note 1.
36. See note 20, supra.
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"municipal immunity" doctrine. The final answer, however, lies with the legis-
lature. Already it has recognized that counties, cities, boroughs, townships
and unincorporated towns should be liable for the negligence of their em-
ployees involved in vehicular accidents. 7 A statute rendering the state liable
for the torts of its agents and servants committed by means other than
vehicular accident is now most desirable.
This question remains: What type of legislative action would best serve
the needs of tortiously injured citizens and yet protect the state from possible
financial difficulties? A plan, requiring a minimum of tax increase, would
entail simply a direction by the legislature that every employee of the state
and local government, as an incident of employment, purchase liability in-
surance graduated to the risk of the employee's particular activity. Perhaps,
but not necessarily, the legislature could appropriate funds to pay a portion
of the purchase price of such insurance. The practical effect of such a plan
would be to protect the prospective plaintiff without denying the state the
alleged advantages found in immunity. The government employees faced
with another pay cut would naturally be hostile to such a plan. A modifica-
tion, placing the responsibility on the local governmental units and/or state
agencies to purchase liability insurance for its employees might prove less
cumbersome. Another possibility, undoubtedly requiring increased tax reve-
nues, would be to simply consent to full liability .3 The soundest answer may
lie with a State Claims Act patterned after the Federal Torts Claims Act .3
This would allow the state to limit liability, yet compensate worthy claimants.
It would also subject local government and particularly local police functions
to an increased public awareness checking any opportunity of city officials
or employees to abuse their station; and in special cases permit the alloca-
tion of funds beyond the maximum limit set by the legislature.40
37. PA. STAT. ANN. Title 75, § 212 (1926).
38. See note 30, supra. The situation in New York is governed by a statute of
this type.
39. See note 30, supra.
40. There are certain problems presented by the state constitution which should
be noted to insure the validity of a statute including this type of provision. For example
in Collins v. Commonwealth, 262 Pa. 572, 106 Ati. 229 (1919), the state was negligent
in the maintenance of a highway. The plaintiff managed to have an act passed by the
legislature (Act of May 10, 1917, P.L. 159.) which authorized her to sue the Com-
monwealth for the death of her husband. The supreme court held the act to be
unconstitutional. Article III, § 7 prohibits the General Assembly from passing local
or special laws regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of
evidence in, any judicial proceeding. The court felt that since the state was not liable
before the act, the act in question was a special law regulating practice and changing
the rules of evidence. Also art. III, §§ 11 & 18 prohibits the passing of a special bill
to compensate an individual plaintiff.
A statute aimed at a class or classes of persons would be of the type necessary to
circumvent these constitutional difficulties.
19611
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It is believed that the strict application of governmental immunity on both
the state and local level has become an anomaly in the law. It has been
pointed out that the judicial power in this area is so restricted that it cannot
afford adequate relief to those harmed by governmental activities. It is
hoped that in the near future the legislature will take measures to correct
the hardships produced by a strict adherence to the doctrine of governmental
immunity.
DONALD L. REIHART
AN UNWARRANTED EXTENSION OF THE
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In the case of Bennett v. Norban,1 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ex-
tended the action for an invasion of the right of privacy far beyond its
former limits. It is the purpose of this note to show that this extension
would seem to be unwarranted.
The factual situation of the case is not unusual. The plaintiff was
shopping in the defendant's store and decided to buy a purse. She could
not find a cashier to pay for it, and being in a hurry, she put it back on the
counter and left the store. No sooner had she reached the sidewalk when
she was overtaken by the assistant manager of the store who blocked her
way, took her purse and searched it and her pockets. Finding nothing, he
returned the purse and ran back into the store. The plaintiff alleged an
invasion of privacy, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and slander. The
lower court's order sustaining preliminary objections as to the right of
privacy and slander was reversed upon appeal.
In order to show that recovery on this ground would seem to be un-
warranted, it is necessary initially to review the history of the tort both
generally and in Pennsylvania. As a general rule, rights of recovery at
common law have developed when the need for such rights evolved. Since
life was less complex in earlier times, there was no need for an action for
damages for an invasion of the right of privacy. During the nineteenth
century, however, as civilization became more intricate, various courts in
England and the United States alluded in their decisions to something
similar to an action for an invasion of the right of privacy. 2 Their reasoning
was not based explicitly upon the right of privacy, but rather on a property
right 3 or a breach of confidence. 4 Thus, in some instances, the common law
has traveled through the extension of settled principles into the void of a
hitherto uncompensated area. Another, and perhaps more favorable process
by which the scope of the common law has expanded is the introduction of
an entirely new concept to cover a specific situation. An example of this
method was the establishment of the action for an invasion of the right of
privacy in America.
In 1890, Samuel Warren advocated the establishment of recovery for
the invasion of privacy. After having had some trouble with newspaper
1. 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959).
2. Marion Manola v. Stevens and Myers, N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Times June
15, 18, 21 (1890) ; Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeG & Son 652, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171
(1849).
3. Hoyt v. Mackenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. 320, Chancery Rep. (1848).
4. Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac & W. 394, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820).
253
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reportings concerning his wife's social affairs, ' he collaborated with Louis
D. Brandeis to write an article for the Harvard Law Review entitled "The
Right to Privacy."'6 The writers' purpose is clearly illustrated by the follow-
ing paragraph from the article:
For years there has been a feeling that the law must afford
some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private
persons .... The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety, and of decency. Gossip is no longer the re-
source of the idle and the vicious but has become a trade, which is
pursued with industry as well as effrontery ...but modern enter-
prise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, sub-
jected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be
inflicted by mere bodily injury.
7
Therefore, they advocated the institution of a cause of action, protecting the
right to have one's affairs kept private. Almost at once, Brandeis and
Warren's theory met with resistance in the courts. In 1902 the Court of
Appeals of New York declared that the right of privacy did not exist at
common law, and, therefore, damages would not be rendered for an invasion
thereof. The court added that a decision for the plaintiff would subject the court
to endless litigation of picayunish squabbles. 8 However, public opinion favor-
able to the action increased due to the actions of the press,9 and so much protest
followed this particular decision that the New York legislature passed a
statute creating a cause of action for the invasion of the right of privacy.10
This statute made it a misdemeanor to use for advertising or trade purposes
the name, portrait, or picture of a living person without his consent. It
also enabled the person so injured to recover damages or secure an injunction.
In other jurisdictions sentiment for an action for damages for an invasion
of privacy soon gained a foothold. An action, brought in Georgia, involved the
unlicensed use of a name and picture in an advertising testimonial. 1 On
appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court accepted the reasoning of Brandeis and
Warren and granted recovery. This case, Pavesich v. New England Life
Insurance Co., became a milestone on the path to recognition of the action.
12
5. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
6. 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
7. Id. at 195.
8. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 422 (1902).
9. Prosser, supra note 5 at 385.
10. N.Y. SESS. LAWS, 1903, Ch. 132 §§ 1-2; as amended N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§§ 50-51 (1921). This action was limited to "advertising and trade purposes" and the
court, in Sidis v. F.R. Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) cert. den., 311 U.S.
711 (1940), ruled that dissemination of biographical articles, which were true, did not
constitute a violation of the Act.
11. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
12. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
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Subsequently, the action for an invasion of the right of privacy developed
to the point that it has been accepted in most jurisdictions.
13
The idea was first introduced into Pennsylvania jurisprudence as an
additional argument in a concurring opinion by Justice Maxey in the case of
Waring v. W.D.A.S.14 Later there was some litigation involving the right
in the lower courts of Pennsylvania and in the Federal courts. 1 The
distinguishing feature of all the cases in which the plaintiff recovered was
the fact that they all involved the unauthorized use of a portrait or a name
for commercial purposes.
In 1954, a case directly involving an invasion of the right of privacy
was considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.1" The court did not
expressly recognize an invasion of privacy as a tort, but they did find that
the actions of the defendant were legitimate matters of public interest, which
is now a recognized limitation on the right of privacy, 7 and the court denied
recovery on that ground.
After this decision, the action was asserted more frequently as more
and more liberties were being taken by publishing companies in seeking
news and entertainment for the public. In 1956, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court considered the question of invasion of privacy in the case of Hull v.
The Curtis Publishing Co.' 8 A photograph, taken of three Philadelphia
policemen with a suspect, was published by the defendant in an article, the
subject of which was different from the true story of the photograph. The
article was an account of the experiences of a California police chief, and was
directed toward leisure readers.
The plaintiffs claimed that the article represented them as "bullies,"
and that as a result it had caused them to suffer numerous invasions of
privacy. 19 The defendant's plea of the statute of limitations forced the court
to consider the action for an invasion of privacy in order to determine whether
it was a personal tort or a property tort. The court assumed that the action
was accepted in Pennsylvania for the purpose of argument.
The court reviewed the history of the tort in Pennsylvania setting forth
13. Id. at 386-87; see N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW, supra note 9; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, §§ 839-40 (1958) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-8 and 76-4-9 (1953) ; VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-650 (1957). In the other states that recognize the action it has been adopted
by judicial decision. Prosser, supra note 5 at 386.
14. 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937).
15. Harlow v. Buno. Co., 36 Pa. D.&C. 101 (1939) ; Clayman v. Bernstein 38 Pa.
D.&C. 543 (1940) ; Lisowski v. Jaskiewicz, 76 Pa. D.&C. 79 (1951); Leverton v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Thompson v. Curtis Publishing
,Co., 193 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1952). See also Comment, 61 DICK. L. REV. 285 (1957).
16. Schnabel v. Merideth, 378 Pa. 609, 107 A.2d 860 (1954).
17. Id. at 615, 107 A.2d at 863.
18. 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956).
19. Id. at 89, 90, 125 A.2d at 645.
1961]
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the proposition that the action is for an "intrusion" upon a man's feelings,
and that it can only be brought by the injured party. Continuing its in-
vestigation, the court stated the limitations on the action, saying, "The right
is generally recognized to exist only where the wrongful intrusion is in such
a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation
to a person of ordinary sensibilities. ' ' 20 The opinion further stated, "to
hold that the photograph published in this case to be an invasion . . . of
privacy would be extending that right beyond the limits to which it previously
has been applied and beyond which it was intended to apply.
' 21
At the same time the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was considering the
tort of invasion of privacy in the Mack Appeal.22 The court did not deny
the existence of an action for the invasion of the right of privacy, but
neither did it expressly adopt it. Rather, it used the right as a basis for
vindicating the power of a county court in holding photographers in contempt
of court for taking clandestine pictures of a defendant in a murder trial
contrary to the rules of the county court.
In 1959 the superior court decided the case of Aquino v. The Bulletin
Co. 23 This case involved the publication of an item which was newsworthy
in its own right, but which the defendant had embellished with more facts,
added a picture and printed in its Sunday magazine section. In allowing
recovery the court defined the action according to the Restatement of Torts
which states that a "Person who unreasonably or seriously interferes with
another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness
exhibited to the public is liable to the other. '24 The opinion continued, "The
rule is relative depending, of course, upon the time and place . . .,,,25 and
went further in stating that items of newsworthiness are not invasions in
themselves.
The first case, in which the right was squarely faced by the Supreme
Court, was Bennett v. Norban.2 6 Here, the plaintiff had sued in four counts:
assault and battery, slander, invasion of privacy, and false imprisonment.
Her appeal to the court involved questions on the counts of slander and
invasion of privacy. The court found that the assistant manager's actions
were slanderous, 27 and then proceeded to discuss the question of the alleged
invasion of privacy. The court based its decision in part upon the Mack
20. Id. at 99, 125 A.2d at 650.
21. Id. at 101, 125 A.2d at 651.
22. 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956). See also Comment, 61 DICK. L. REV. 191
(1957).
23. 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959).
24. Id. at 532, 154 A.2d at 425.
25. Ibid.
26. 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959).
27. Id. at 98, 151 A.2d at 478.
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Appeal,2 8 which as noted above, did not involve an invasion of the right of
privacy, but merely used the right of privacy to vindicate the authority of a
county court to protect a prisoner in its custody. The court also supported
its decision by the case law of Pennsylvania and the Restatement of Torts. 29
It is submitted that this case represents an unwarranted extension of
the action for the invasion of the right of privacy. The reasons for this con-
clusion are: (1) the basic rules of the common law itself; (2) the original
purpose of the action as promulgated by Brandeis and Warren; and (3) the
limits of the action and its purpose as shown by the case law of Pennsylvania.
The first reason for the extension not being warranted is found deeply
embedded in the roots of the common law. It is an old proposition that,
"where the reason for the rule no longer exists the court should do away with
the rule." A corollary to this rule is, "where there is already adequate relief,
there is no reason for additional remedies." Since there was already adequate
relief in the forms of existing torts in this area, there should have been no
extension of the action for the invasion of privacy.291
In addition, to create this right co-extensive with other torts, ignores the
original purpose of the action. As proposed by Brandeis and Warren, it was
to fill a void in the common law in order to protect individuals from the
actions of the press and commercial interests. 30 But Brandeis and Warren
qualified their statement to the effect that,
It is only the more flagrant breaches of decency and propriety
that could in practice be reached, and it is not perhaps desirable
even to attempt to repress everything which the nicest taste and
keenest sense of the respect due to private life would condemn.
31
One must add to this purpose the limitations placed upon the action in
the courts of Pennsylvania. Of all the other cases litigated in the various
courts of the state, the only recoveries that have been allowed, were in situa-
tions that involved an unwarranted use of another's photograph, name, or
private affairs for commercial purposes. In Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co. the
superior court limited the action by saying, "the gravamen of the action ...
is the injury to the feelings of the plaintiff, the mental anguish and distress
28. 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956).
29. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867 (1934). However, the examples given in this
section impliedly limit the right to instances of publication.
29a. In Bennett v. Norban, the court states: "Often no other remedy exists, but
if one is concurrent it does not obliterate the right of privacy" 396 Pa. at 99, 151 A.2d
at 497. However, since one count was slander, could not the right of privacy by substi-
tution create a right of action which heretofore did not survive the decedent: PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20 § 320.601 (1949).
30. 4 HARV. L. REv. 195, 196 (1890).
31. Id. at 216.
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caused by the publication. ' '3 2 By using the word publication the court
impliedly limited it to such actions.
if the action is restricted accordingly, rights protected will remain in
proper perspective. However, the introduction of the right of privacy into
this area might well confuse the theories of liability and, by indirect effect,
destroy what settled areas there exist in the law today. As Dean Prosser
pointed out in his article, "Privacy" :33
One cannot fail to be aware, in reading privacy cases, of the extent
to which defenses, limitations, and safeguards established for the
protection of the defendant in other tort fields have been jettisoned,
disregarded, or ignored. Taking intrusion first, the gist of the
wrong is clearly the intentional infliction of mental distress, which
is now in itself a recognized basis of tort liability. Where such
mental disturbance stands on its own feet, the courts have insisted
upon extreme outrage, rejecting all liability for trivialities, and
upon genuine and serious mental harm, attested by physical illness,
or by the circumstances of the case. But once "privacy" gets into
the picture, and the fact of intrusion is added, such guarantees
apparently are no longer required. No doubt the cases thus far have
been sufficiently extreme; but the question may well be raised
whether there are not some limits . . .34
Perhaps it may be said that Bennett v. Norban is "sufficiently extreme,"
yet the fact remains that the woman could have been fully compensated for
her injuries on more conventional grounds.
SCOTT L. HUYETT
32. Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. at 97, 125 A.2d at 649 (1956).
33. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
34. Id. at 422. While it may be asserted Prosser's comments are not appropriate
insofar as Pennsylvania law does not seem to recognize intentional affliction of mental
disturbance, nevertheless the right of privacy should not take the place of the inten-
tional infliction because the gravamen of the wrong in the latter is the nature of the
act while in the former it is the result of the act.
SUPERIOR COURT'S POWER TO OVERRULE A SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION
Must a rule pronounced by the supreme court prior to the creation of the
superior court and left unchanged by the legislature be followed by the
superior court?' Recently the superior court in Manley v. Manley2 answered
this question thusly:
The rule was pronounced many years ago, and there is authority
for our ignoring an ancient higher court rule which is unreasonable
and unjust by all known standards, and which has frequently been
examined and universally rejected by legal authorities and by courts
in other jurisdictions .... We shall not follow the rule."
The rule that the superior court refused to follow was pronounced by Mr.
Chief justice Gibson in Matchin v. Matchin4 in 1847 when the supreme
court held that insanity was not a defense to a divorce action brought on
the ground of adultery. In the Manley case, the court rationalized that they
should not follow a rule which has failed to withstand the light of judicial
and scholarly examination.-" In examining the propriety of this decision we
must look to the constitution and the pertinent statutes.
Under the Constitution of Pennsylvania, the judicial power is vested in
the "Supreme court, court of common pleas . . . and such other courts as the
General Assembly may from time to time establish. ' ' 6 The jurisdiction of the
supreme court extends "over the State ... [and has] appellate jurisdiction
by appeal, certiorari, or writ of error in all cases, as is now or may hereafter
be provided by the law." 7 The jurisdictional basis of this court must be
1. It is the duty of an intermediate appellate court of a state to accept and follow
the rulings of the court of last resort in the state, whenever applicable precedents are
found, without a re-examination of the questions involved, and, if necessary, to over-
rule its own previous decisions to the contrary. These intermediate courts, although
they have revisory jurisdiction over the courts of first instance, within the limits marked
out, and are entitled to set precedents for them, are still subordinate to the court of last
resort, and are imperatively required to be guided in their own decisions by the rulings
made by that court, whenever a decision is presented to their notice which fairly rules
the case on trial. When this occurs, the intermediate court must not enter upon a fresh
examination of the question of law involved, but must take the rule as laid down by the
court of final appeal, whatever may be its own views of the correctness of that rule,
and whatever may have been the course of its own previous decisions on the same
point. BLACK, LAW OF JUDIcIAL PRECEDFNTs 299 (1912); see also Mitchell v. City of
Dothan, 33 Ala. 19, 30 So. 2d 735 (1946) where the court said that a supreme court's
opinion standing on such court's report for nearly 100 years and never disturbed, modified,
or overruled, is binding and controlling on the court of appeal under statute. Recently
the supreme court in Bell's Appeal defined clearly the superior court's power to issue
certiorari in holding that the superior court was not vested with the common law King's
Bench powers over inferior tribunals. Bell Appeal, 396 Pa. 592, 152 A.2d 731 (1959).
2. 193 Pa. Super 252, 164 A.2d 113 (1960).
3. Id. at 264, 164 A.2d at 120.
4. 6 Pa. 332, 337 (1847).
5. Manley v. Manley, supra note 2 at 262, 164 A.2d at 119.
6. PA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1874).
7. PA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (1874).
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distinguished from that of the superior court which was created by statute in
1895 pursuant to the above constitutional provision.8 Its jurisdiction and
power, being statutory, must be found in the enabling act.9
Apparently the drafters of the statute creating the superior court realized
that there might be a conflict between the decisions of the two appellate courts
and expressly included in the superior court's enabling act that "upon any
question whatever before the said court the decision of the supreme court
shall be received and followed as of binding authority."10 (Emphasis added.)
This limitation on the superior court's power has been recognized and fol-
lowed by the court until the present.11 In Manley, the court recognized that
the above statute applied, and that they ordinarily are required to follow the
pronouncements of the highest court, but said:
[T]his court has had jurisdiction over divorce appeals for 65 years,
and as far as we have been able to determine, during this time the
Supreme Court has made no reference in any divorce case to the rule
on insanity . . . and there is authority for our ignoring an ancient
higher court rule which is unreasonable and unjust by all known
standards .... 12 (Emphasis added.)
In order to do this, the court in Manley relied on Comm onwealth v.
Franklin13 which was concerned with an accused's rights to be free after
gaining acquittal without the signing or posting of a peace bond. Although
the supreme court had previously affirmed the procedure of requiring a peace
bond, the court in Franklin said:
In such circumstances there would ordinarily remain nothing further
for consideration by a lower court but compliance with the law as
pronounced by the highest tribunal of this Commonwealth. . . . But
. . . none of the judicial authorities relied upon is of even compara-
tively recent date and there are raised in this proceeding, for the first
time, constitutional questions of grave import.14 (Emphasis added.)
The court held that the requirement of a peace bond as a condition for free-
dom after acquittal was unconstitutional as violative of due process. Since
the issue in the Franklin case was one of first impression in that it involved
a constitutional question not previously passed upon by the supreme court,
the court did not overrule a prior supreme court decision. Thus in Manley,
the court could not strictly rely on Franklin as authority since the issue of
insanity as a defense to adultery in divorce proceedings had been previously
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ Ill et seq. (1895).
9. Taggert v. DeFillippo, 315 Pa. 438, 13 Atl. 423 (1934).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 198 (1895).
11. Sherman v. Welsh, 87 Pa. Super. 282, 284 (1926).
12. Manley v. Manley, supra note 2 at 263, 264, 164 A.2d at 119, 120.
13. 172 Pa. Super. 152, 92 A.2d 272 (1952).
14. Id. at 155, 92 A.2d at 274.
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passed upon by the supreme court. 1 5 Obviously the court was looking beyond
Franklin.
The superior court gave no other authority for overruling a prior supreme
court case, but the statutory language creating the court provides that the
superior court shall have the "exclusive and final appellate jurisdiction,"' 6
over "appeals in proceedings for divorce.' 7 This sole jurisdiction is tempered
by another provision allowing appeal to the supreme court:
First. If the jurisdiction of the superior court is in issue; or
Second. If the case involves the construction or application of the
constitution of the United States or of any statute or treaty of
the United States; or
Third. If the case involves the construction or application of the
constitution of Pennsylvania; or
Fourth. If the appeal to the supreme court be specially allowed by
the superior court itself or by any one justice of the supreme
court.'8
It has been repeatedly said that apart from statute no right of appeal exists,' 9
and that "where a statute says that the order of a court shall be 'conclusive'
or 'final,' it is the same as if it would say 'there shall be no appeal.' "o20 Since
the statute creating the superior court provides for "exclusive jurisdiction"
but permits appeal, the court's power is one of statutory interpretation.
A liberal interpretation of the provisions establishing the court would
seem to give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature that the superior
court is to have exclusive jurisdiction "subject to" an appeal to the supreme
court. Such an appeal would not seem to be a matter of right as noted in
Kraemer v. Guarantee Trust Company2' which held that:
The Authority of the Justices of the Supreme Court to allow special
appeals is not limited, but it is apparent from the general scheme of
the act that it is intended to be exceptional and based on considera-
tions other than the mere desire or interest of the particular parties.
The most obvious of such considerations are the bearing of the ques-
tion on public interest or rights, the importance of the decision as
a precedent in frequently occurring litigation diversity of opinions
in other courts and consequent desirability of a final determination,
15. It is interesting to note that in the briefs the parties argued that this case was
one of first impression, but the court noted that the Matchin rule was in fact decisive.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 181 (1895).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 186 (1899).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 190 (1895).
19. School District of Robinson Township v. Houghton, 387 Pa. 236, 128 A.2d 58
(1956) ; Appeal of McIntyre, 343 Pa. 87, 22 A.2d 200 (1941); Whetsel v. Shaw, 343
Pa. 182, 22 A.2d 751 (1941) ; Wood v. Harlan, 78 Pa. Super. 92 (1921).
20. Wynnewood Civic Assoc. v. Township of Lower Merian, 180 Pa. Super. 453,
119 A.2d 799 (1956) ; In re White t.p. School District, 300 Pa. 422, 150 Atl. 744 (1930)
see also PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Appeals § 2 (1957).
21. 173 Pa. 416, 33 Atl. 1047 (1896).
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and generally the preservation of uniformity in the application of
legal principles.
22
Again in Phipps v. Phipps21 the supreme court said "what had theretofore
been the function of the court with respect to the review of the entire record
on the appeal of a divorce case became the province of the Superior Court.
' -2 4
Since the supreme court has taken the position that it regards the superior
court as having exclusive jurisdiction over divorce, with an appeal allowed
in very limited circumstances, a reasonable interpretation of "exclusive"
would seem to be complete control-almost absolute.
This would appear to follow the legislature's intent when they provided
that "there may still be an appeal from the decision of the superior court.'
'2 5
(Emphasis added.) By giving effect to such an intent of the legislature, it
is reasonable that the words "may still be an appeal" allows an appeal, not
as a matter of right, but one of "grace." Thus the superior court obtained
near absolute jurisdiction over divorce proceedings which would seem to
give it the quasi-discretionary power to decide when a supreme court's anti-
quated precedent no longer meets the policy prevailing under divorce law.
Even though the superior court may have the quasi-type discretion to over-
rule prior case law in which they have exclusive jurisdiction, the discretion
is limited by the reserved power of the supreme court to review.2 This would
allow the supreme court's decisions still to be of binding authority and at
the same time would serve as a check on the superior court's quasi-discretion.
The result would be that the overruling of a prior decision of the supreme
court by the superior court could only be accomplished by the exercise of
their quasi-discretion when the policy of the law over which they have ex-
clusive jurisdiction has changed so completely that it would probably be
condoned by the supreme court on review.
If a stricter statutory construction27 were applied in determining the
power of the superior court, a different result might occur. Under this view
"exclusive and final appellate jurisdiction ' 2 8 would be read in light of other
provisions of the enabling act requiring that the "decisions of the supreme
22. Id. at 418, 33 Atl. at 1048.
23. 368 Pa. 291, 81 A.2d 523 (1951).
24. Id. at 297, 81 A.2d at 526.
25. PA. STAT. AZ4N. tit. 17, § 190 (1895).
26. PA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (1874). "(The Supreme court] shall have appellate
jurisdiction by appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as is not or may hereafter be pro-
vided."
27. The Statutory Construction Act of 1937 lays down rules for strict and liberal
construction by providing: "All provisions of a law of the classes hereafter enumerated
shall be strictly construed: . . . (7) Provisions decreasing the jurisdiction of a court
of record." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558 (1937). This statute embodies the prior
common law. Burginhofen v. Martin, 3 Yeates 479 (Pa. 1803) ; Zack v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co., 25 Pa. 394 (1855).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 181 (1895).
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court shall be received and followed as of binding authority." 29 This would
limit "exclusive jurisdiction" in that where the supreme court has passed on
a question, the superior court is bound to follow the precedent. Exclusive
jurisdiction would be further limited by the statute providing for an appeal
"in any action or proceeding whatever ... committed to the final and ex-
clusive jurisdiction '13 0 of the superior court. Such a limitation narrows "ex-
clusive" and negates any discretion that the superior court has in overruling
a decision of the supreme court.
The superior court's authority to overrule a supreme court's decision
would also have to overcome the doctrine of stare decisis. 3I This rule, which
is firmly entrenched in Pennsylvania law, 3 2 is based upon the importance of
certainty and stability in the law and the necessity of preserving rights and
titles vested, and contracts made, on the faith of judicial decisions which were
accepted as correct expositions of the law.3 3 Without it the law of yesterday
might not be the rule of today, and the rule of today might not be the law
of tomorrow.3 4 Even though stare decisis has been attacked as stultifying the
law, 1 5 it should be recognized that "until a decision is changed by the authority
which made it ... [the law] must be treated as a decision pronounced upon
a consideration of every argument and reason which existed and could then
have been advanced against the act."'3 6 However, the superior court is in no
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 198 (1895).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 190 (1895).
31. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court of the United States and the courts of
last resort of every state of the Union observe the doctrine of stare decisis, but hold
that they have the right to deviate from and to overrule their own prior decisions when-
ever they are manifestly erroneous, and they have done so in many instances. See POL-
LOCK, FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE, 319, 320; Gray, Judicial Precedents, 9 HARV. L.
REV. 27, 40 (1895).
32. Philadelphia v. Cline, 158 Pa. Super. 179, 44 A.2d 610 (1945) ; Lemon v.
Campbell, 136 Pa. Super. 370, 7 A.2d 643 (1939).
33. Justice Black stated in his dissent in Hole v. Rittenhouse, 2 Phila. 411, 418
(Pa. 1856) that "If each new set of Judges shall consider themselves at liberty to over-
throw the doctrines of their predecessors, our system of jurisprudence would be the
most fickle, uncertain and vicious that the civilized world ever saw. . . .A French con-
stitution, or a South American republic, or a Mexican administration would be an im-
mortal thing in comparison to the short-lived principles of Pennsylvania law. To avoid
this great calamity, I know of no resource but that of stare decisis."
34. Ellenbogen, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which it Should
be Applied, 20 TEMP. L. Q. 503 (1947).
35. There are, however, instances where precedents are properly deviated from:
Pound, What of Stare Decisis, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1941) ; CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
JUDICIAL PROCESS, 150, 151 (1921). Moschzisker, the late Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, cautions that "unless administered wisely, the doctrine may,
through its tendency to perpetuate that which is traditional prevent the law from keep-
ing pace with changing conditions, and work unnecessary hardship in particular cases."
MOSCHZISKER, STARE DECISiS, RES JUDICATA AND OTHER SELECTED ESSAYS, 2 (1929).
36. Wheeler v. Rice, 4 Brewster 129, 130 (Pa. 1871), aff'd. 83 Pa. 232 (1877).
But if the new court is invested with the same jurisdiction as the old one, and simply
succeeds to its duties and functions, so as to be practically a continuation of it, the
decisions of the old court are binding on the new court in exactly the same way and to
the same extent as its own decisions. BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 190 (1912).
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way entirely restricted if it feels that a decision passed upon by the supreme
court is unjust, since the legislature anticipated the problem by providing not
only an appeal, but also gave a right to:
[A] ny four of the judges of the superior court . . . [to] certify that,
in their judgment, the questions involved in any case are so difficult
or important as to make it expedient that the case should be decided
by the supreme court . . . such question shall be certified for full
consideration and decision.3 7 (Emphasis added.)
Since the rationale of the Franklin case fails to support the proposition
placed upon it by the Manley case, it would seem that the superior court is
following the liberal interpretation of the statute. Under this view the trial
courts are now faced with the problem as to what law they should folloA
as being binding on them. Technically, they could follow either court's deci-
sion. If they choose to adhere to the superior court's holding, then it would
follow that they would be affirmed on appeal to that court; but, if they rely
on the supreme court's ruling, then there is the risk of antagonizing that
court and the result would surely be reversal. 38 The only safeguard under
the liberal view is the superior court's own quasi-discretion in deciding when
the policy has sufficient changed to make a supreme court's holding antiquated.
A stricter construction would alleviate the problem somewhat in that the
superior court would be bound to follow the supreme court's decisions as
binding. This view would still allow the superior court to seek a needed
change in the law, but would follow the method provided in the statute allow-
ing the court to apply for certification of important cases to the supreme
court. Because of the certainty obtained under this view, the lower courts
could also readily ascertain what law is binding authority.
MARWIN A. BATT
JOHN W. BLASKO
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 197 (1895).
38. It may well be that the trial court may determine the effect by the procedure
followed after a decision by the superior court. If allocatur was refused by the supreme
court, the decision of the superior court would be binding. If no allocatur was filed with
the supreme court, or if the parties decided not to appeal, then the trial court could
follow the superior court. However, it does not follow that if allocatur is not
requested, that the supreme court necessarily acquieces to the superior court's decision.
